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Austerity and financial governance: a UK case study of the National Health 
Service 
Abstract 
Purpose – This research concerns the issue of financial governance within the UK NHS and aims to 
assess the effectiveness of existing financial governance arrangements in the main providers of 
health services in the UK. Also considered is the importance of good financial governance in a time 
of financial austerity. 
Design/methodology/approach – The primary research for this project was based on the use of a 
questionnaire to all finance directors in NHSTs in England supported by semi-structured interviews 
with: finance directors, non-executive directors, executive directors and senior finance staff. 
Findings – Among the main findings of the study were: certain financial management systems were 
not prioritised in line with what is seen as good practice; existing financial management systems 
were not always seen as adequate for the achievement of good financial governance; there was 
sometimes a lack of understanding of financial issues by non-executive directors; and the complexity 
of the NHS funding process often resulted in opaqueness of the financial risks. 
Research limitations/implications – The research is limited by the relatively small coverage of NHS 
trusts but this has been compensated for by a series of in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in 
the governance process. 
Practical implications – Weaknesses in financial governance could result in further scandals which 
result in loss of life and poor patient care. 
Originality/value – There are many papers on the issue of governance in the public sector in general 
and the NHS in particular. However, there is little published on the issue of financial governance in 
the NHS. Also of great value is the emphasis on strengthening financial governance in an era of 
austerity 
Introduction 
Governance in business organisations has been at the forefront of political, economic and 
commercial debate for many years. The response to early governance failures from the 1990 s 
onwards was a series of reports and guidance, particularly, Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), 
Hampel (1998), and Higgs (2003), which provided valuable guidance and templates for behaviour 
that should prevent governance failures. More recently, the current financial crisis in the western 
world generated considerable discussion concerning the failure of governance systems in the 
banking industry (Conyon et al., 2011; Berglof, 2011; Yeh et al., 2011) and this is after several major 
corporate failures such as Enron, WorldCom, Polly Peck, BCCI and Lehman Brothers (Solomon, 2007). 
Thus, governance issues still appear to be problematic. Around the same time, there were also 
concerns in the UK public sector about governance failures especially in the National Health Service 
(NHS). Cases included concerns about computer contract overruns in Wessex Regional Health 
Authority and the privatisation of the management services division in the West Midlands Regional 
Health Authority. Consequently, there was a plethora of guidance and advice in relation to 
governance in the public sector. 
There is now a further contextual issue. Currently, (and for some time to come), public services in 
many countries are going through a period often referred to as financial austerity. The term 
austerity is complex and ill-defined but can be thought of as a financial environment where the 
public sectors has to operate in a situation where the annual growth in financial resources is 
sometimes nil or even negative, whilst the Government is attempting to enable growth in the 
economy at the same time (Ferry and Eckersley, 2011; Ferry and Eckersley, 2012). This contrasts 
sharply with previous eras where public authorities received annual growth in resources. In many 
countries this unprecedented situation will require difficult decisions to be made in the public sector 
about the use of declining resources and it is important that such organisations have effective 
financial governance arrangements in place when such decisions are being made. Governance in any 
organisation is complex and multi-faceted. In the NHS, governance has many different dimensions 
including: clinical governance, corporate governance, financial governance etc. This paper is an 
empirically based study of financial governance, within what are termed NHS Trusts, or Foundation 
Trusts: –these being the main providers of health services in the UK (abbreviated in both cases to 
NHSTs), and particularly the nature of financial governance in a time of severe and unprecedented 
financial austerity. In doing this it is recognised that financial governance is only one aspect of the 
whole gamut of governance and has strong inter-relationships with other aspects of governance. 
Description of the research 
NHSTs are faced with mounting pressures that have finance at the very core and correspondingly the 
systems of financial governance are likely to be tested. Clearly NHSTs will have various frameworks 
of financial governance which have been in place for some time and, in all probability, these 
frameworks will show variations in the degree of adequacy or robustness. 
The onset of financial austerity involves something of a paradigm change. The NHS itself is going 
from an organisation which received significant annual growth in funding throughout the first 64 
years of its existence to a situation where it now must operate in an environment of virtually nil 
growth in resources (Appleby et al., 2009) and the need to generate large scale efficiency savings. 
Whatever the robustness of existing frameworks of financial governance, it seems probable that the 
onset of this austerity will place pressure on those frameworks and will require change. 
The underlying purpose of this research concerns the effectiveness of financial governance in the 
NHS in a new organisational paradigm. The project focusses on financial governance in those 
organisations responsible for the delivery of the vast bulk of publicly-funded health services in the 
UK, namely NHSTs. The main aims of this study were as follows: 
. to clarify the meaning and purpose of financial governance, within the overall governance 
framework in NHSTs; 
. to identify what should constitute good practice in relation to financial governance 
regimes; 
. to obtain views about the degree of importance attached, by respondents, to various 
aspects of good financial governance in the NHS, particularly in the context of financial 
austerity; and 
. to obtain views from respondents about the degree of compliance with these aspects of 
good financial governance in their NHST. 
The authors designed a multi-method approach for triangulation, in terms of method, organisation 
and professional role to enable claims of both ecological and population validity (Gill and Johnson, 
2010). 
The organisations targeted for the project were NHSTs in England as these were the types of 
organisation, identified where there had been failings in governance. Initial talks were undertaken 
with senior NHS managers, at a strategic level, to establish support for the study and as a sounding-
board for ideas. 
A questionnaire was designed to gather information concerning practices and understandings for 
financial governance in the NHS identified from the Delivering Excellence in Financial Governance 
document (NHS, 2003). The questionnaire was pilot tested with a group of NHS finance professionals 
and subsequently circulated electronically to all DoFs in England in NHSTs. A 12 per cent rate of 
return was achieved and analysed to determine trends in responses. 
After receipt and analysis of the questionnaire additional face-to-face interview questions were 
established based upon the survey results. In total ten interviews were undertaken with a 
combination of DoFs, NEDs and other finance staff with governance responsibilities for their 
organisations, from one region of England considered representative from the survey results. In 
addition documents were obtained from research sites, primarily reports to the board concerning 
financial governance. Once the analysis was complete the key findings were reviewed by the 
research team with senior NHS personal from across the UK. 
Governance and financial governance in the NHS 
The issue of corporate governance has, since Cadbury (1992), been defined and debated. The 
CadburǇ ‘epoƌt itself defiŶes Đoƌpoƌate goǀeƌŶaŶĐe siŵplǇ as ͞the system by which companies are 
diƌeĐted aŶd ĐoŶtƌolled͟ ǁhile “oloŵoŶ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϰͿ extends this to define corporate governance as: 
͞the sǇsteŵ of ĐheĐks aŶd ďalaŶĐes, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that 
companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible 
way in all areas of theiƌ ďusiŶess aĐtiǀitǇ͟. IŶ ƌelatioŶ to the NH“, the UK DepaƌtŵeŶt of Health has 
taken this broad approach in terms of bringing all aspects of healthcare governance under one 
integrated framework (NHS, 2006, p. 10) and defines integrated governance as: ͞sǇsteŵs, pƌoĐesses 
and behaviours by which trusts lead, direct and control their functions in order to achieve 
organisational objectives, safety and quality of service and in which they relate to patients and 
carers, the wider community and partner oƌgaŶisatioŶs͟. 
This definition clearly implies that corporate governance in the NHS is multi-faceted and combines a 
number of elements including: clinical governance, employee governance, financial governance etc. 
The eaƌlǇ ϭϵϵϬ s saǁ the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of the ͚iŶteƌŶal ŵaƌket͛ iŶ healthĐaƌe aŶd the introduction of a 
more commercial style of Board to accompany this new environment, which was financially 
focussed, and therefore altered views of accountability in some parts of the public services, 
particularly the NHS (Ezzamel and Willmott, 1993). Early studies of the new style of Board 
introduced at this time into the NHS indicate that there were issues concerning accountability and 
strategic implementation (Harrison, 1998). However, there was evidence that the new model 
improved the quality of board members and their contribution (Ferlie et al., 1995, Ferlie et al., 
1996). Generally, however, the overwhelming view of the early research was that there were 
difficulties associated with private sector models being imported into the public services without any 
real attempt to adaption to their environment (Clatworthy et al., 2000). The degree of 
appropriateness of this model is again reviewed in this work. 
The issues concerning governance in an NHS environment have been explored, in more recent years, 
largely, in terms of clinical and general governance issues There is, therefore, a paucity of current 
studies examining the financial aspects of governance of healthcare organisations either within the 
UK or internationally. 
Recent years have seen several breakdowns in the services provided in several NHSTs, resulting in 
the avoidable death of patients. Two examples of such failure were at Maidstone and Tunbridge 
Wells NHS Trust (concerning an outbreak of the c-difficile bacterium by the BBC in 2007) and the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. The case of Mid Staffordshire hit the national media and has 
generated many investigations. It concerned many failings in patient care which it is believed led to 
many hundreds of avoidable deaths. In both the above cases, considerable managerial and  
governance failings within the organisations were identified and there was an alleged or perceived 
over-concentration on financial issues by the Board at the expense of service delivery standards, 
which ultimately had an adverse effect on the management resource allocated to service delivery. It 
is sobering to reflect that the events at Maidstone and Mid-Staffs took place some years before the 
onset of austerity and at that time there were already seen to be difficulties in balancing financial 
pressures with service pressures as part of the overall governance process. 
Whilst, in these examples, it is claimed there was an over-focus on financial aspects, in other less-
publicised cases (e.g. Trusts with large overspends) the focus may well have been the other way 
around. These examples clearly illustrate the tension that will always exist between financial aspects 
of governance and other aspects. 
Financial governance within the NHS is wide ranging. The guidance and principles of good financial 
governance within the NHS are set-out iŶ ͚DeliǀeƌiŶg EǆĐelleŶĐe iŶ FiŶaŶĐial GoǀeƌŶaŶĐe͛ ;NH“, 
2003). The main criteria identified for good financial governance are as follows (NHS, 2003, pp. 9-
10): 
. Financial objectives for the organisation are clearly defined and approved by the Board. 
. Board level responsibility for financial management is clearly defined 
. Audit Committee overseeing the financial aspects of governance. 
. Standing Financial Instructions, adopted by the Board, and promulgated throughout the 
organisation. 
. Financial risk management processes exist throughout the organisation. 
. Internal control – there is an effective and documented system for all financial 
management systems. 
. Finance function – There is an adequately resourced, trained and competent finance 
function. 
. Financial management – all employees, including managers and the Board, are provided 
with adequate information, instruction and training. 
. Review of internal control – the Board reviews the effectiveness of its system of internal 
financial control at least annually. 
. Performance – the Board receives regular reports on financial performance and activity. 
. Risks – the Board is made aware of significant risks and determines and takes appropriate 
action. 
While the above elements of financial governance are clear and precise and are built upon sound 
governance principles, it is the understanding and application of these guidelines that is important 
and that, in addition, to systems, processes, skills etc., the appropriate behaviours are present, 
which enable the governance systems to safeguard the interests of all parties. While the contents of 
the above guidance are necessary attributes for good governance, they do not appear to be 
sufficient in that they fail to describe the status of certain key issues which underpin good financial 
governance. 
As part of the financial governance process, Board members need to be assured about the 
robustness and effectiveness of certain key financial and management processes. Reviewing good 
practice in various sectors and discussions with senior finance managers in those sectors lead us to 
conclude that the items shown in Table I are also key aspects of good financial governance in any 
organisation and also need to be considered. 
Research findings 
The research undertaken focussed on those aspects of financial governance listed in 
Table I. The findings have been summarised under the following headings:- 
. Corporate financial strategy. 
. Budgeting systems. 
. Accountability structures and costing systems. 
. Financial reporting to the board. 
. The effectiveness of the Board and its members. 
Corporate financial strategy 
A financially robust corporate strategy is key to dealing with the challenges of austerity as well as 
meeting strategic objectives. Table II shows that there was a relatively high priority attached by DoFs 
to having a financial strategy which underpinned the corporate strategy of the Trust. Furthermore, 
Table III, identifies that 93 per cent of DoFs eitheƌ ͞agƌeed͟ oƌ ͞stƌoŶglǇ agƌeed͟, that the Đoƌpoƌate 
strategy of their NHST was underpinned by a robust financial strategy. However, the qualitative 
findings of the survey also indicated that respondents were concerned, in times of rapid change, that 
it was difficult to plan owing to the rapidly changing environment. 
Table I. Key aspects of financial governance 
  
Interviews with other staff groups indicated a similar finding. The interviews also indicated that in 
spite of the comments about the importance of financial strategy, in reality, there was little 
substantial strategic development taking place generally, and particularly in terms of finance. When 
interviewees were asked to discuss the financial strategy of their organisations there was a 
discussion of strategy documents but few could discuss their financial strategy in any detail or 
indeed the main points of that strategy. 
Thus, there is little evidence to confirm that all NHSTs do have a robust financial strategy. 
Budgeting systems 
An effective budgeting system would usually be regarded as an important vehicle for dealing with 
the challenges of financial austerity, as a means of distributing resources to priority areas, improving 
performance and control etc. The existence of such systems therefore should be a key component of 
good financial governance. There are two key themes to consider: 
(1) whether the budget setting process facilitates the implementation of the corporate strategy of 
the organisation; and 
Table II. The relative priority given to a particular aspect of good financial governance compared to 
other aspects  
 (2) whether there are clear linkages between budgets and expected service volume and 
performance. 
Table II suggests that most DoFs do not see either of these themes as being of great priority with 
respectively 53 per cent and 50 per cent identifying them as a relatively low priority in their NHST. 
This seems a surprising conclusion but it was also supported by the subsequent interviews. 
When we turn to the capabilities of the current budgeting systems both Table III and interview 
findings indicate that while a large majority of respondents view the budget setting process of their 
NHST as operating in such a way that reflects and implements the corporate strategy of the 
organisation almost half of them did not identify a clear link between budget funding and 
expectations of output and quality of service. The latter point appears to suggest significant 
weaknesses in relation to the promotion of organisational performance. 
Accountability structures and costing systems 
A significant majority of DOFs (67 per cent) indicated that their accountability structures were not 
fully clarified through the budgetary control system. This deficiency has been identified by other 
studies as being an issue of concern (Harradine et al., 2011). This is a likely problem for the future in 
terms of the changes in funding patterns facing these organisations and also the need to implement 
difficult cost improvement targets. 
The above is also likely to be compounded by the perceived lack of trust in the adequacy of costing 
systems by DoFs (67 per cent). Many suggested that that Service Line Reporting (SLR) would assist 
this problem. SLR is a methodology that identifies costs to clinical specialties, which is designed to 
assist control through better 
Table III. The extent of agreement with statements about compliance with particular aspects of 
good financial governance 
  
 Table III. 
information flows and accountability systems as well as assisting the planning process (Monitor, 
2006). Initial studies have, however, indicated that while there is considerable potential for this 
system to assist, in the areas outlined, it may not be the panacea to solve all the problems of 
accountability within NHSTs (Harradine and Prowle, 2012). 
These studies indicate that the budgeting systems are seen as control tools. However, in the cases 
eǆploƌed aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ ǁas seeŶ to ďe soŵetiŵes fƌustƌated ďǇ the ͚ƌole͛ of the medical staff in the 
budgetary and SLR processes. This is, therefore, likely to be an issue for the respondents to this 
study and it is suggested that this will also likely to impact upon strategic issues. Overall, these 
findings suggest limitations in NHST budgeting systems which are of particular importance during a 
time of austerity. 
Financial reporting to the Board 
There was a view expressed (Table II) that there needed to be clear reporting to the board on 
financial issues and that there should be a clear reporting structure. In all cases, interviews with 
executive and non-executive board members indicated support for strong financial governance and 
the importance of reporting financial risk to the Board was stated as being paramount. Comments 
were generally favourable concerning the adequacy of audit reporting to the board. 
An examination of a sample of board reports, however, showed in the majority of cases that there 
was considerable detail provided on financial issues and that the total volume of material for every 
meeting was considerable. NEDs often stated that the ǀoluŵe of ŵateƌial ǁas a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ: ͞ĐaŶŶot 
see the ǁoods fƌoŵ the tƌees͟. A ǁorrying outcome of the interviews with NEDs, including chairs of 
trusts, was their answers to the ƋuestioŶ of theiƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s fiŶaŶĐial situatioŶ at that poiŶt iŶ 
time. The aŶsǁeƌs ƌaŶged fƌoŵ aŶ iŶĐoƌƌeĐt aŶsǁeƌ to: ͞I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe ďut ouƌ diƌeĐtoƌ of finance can 
assist Ǉou ǁith that͟. IŶ all Đases theƌe appeaƌed to ďe aŶ oǀeƌ ƌeliaŶĐe oŶ the DOF or other senior 
finance personnel. One chief executive stated that he did not understand the financial issues of the 
organisation but trusted a Non-executive director (NED) who had a financial services background. 
There were examples of NEDs with considerable commercial and finance expertise who also 
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the financial position. 
The effectiveness of the Board and its members 
Table III suggests that DOFs were very much of the view that the contribution of non-executive 
directors was not being maximised. However, it is a mixed picture and oŶe DOF ĐoŵŵeŶted ͞The 
value of non-executives has become apparent over the course of my time in post; however it is a 
truism that not all non-executives are equally ǀaluaďle͟. 
Two interviews undertaken at one site, a large acute hospital, with the chair of the NHST and the 
DOF offered an interesting insight into the dynamics of understanding of the financial issues, 
primarily risk, being faced by the organisation. The chair, as in other cases, did not have a detailed 
understanding of the financial issues of the organisation and said that he was reliant on the skills of 
the DOF who he said was highly skilled and was trusted. He said that he was sure that all items were 
taken to the board if there was a financial risk involved. This point was discussed with the DOF who 
indeed said that he would take important issues to the board but then stated that many of the issues 
of funding were extremely complex and said that many of the problems were dealt by himself 
aŶd/oƌ his teaŵ: ͞. . . it is Ŷot ǁoƌth takiŶg to theŵ ;the Board) as they would not understand the 
intricacies; at times I do not understand how eǀeƌǇthiŶg ǁoƌks͟. This offeƌs aŶ iŶtƌiguiŶg ǀieǁ of the 
complex nature of financial systems with in the NHS and how there is a lack of understanding. The 
above statement was tested with others interviewed and many agreed about the issues of 
complexity and therefore the general lack of understanding of financial issues. One interviewee 
stated that there were few NEDs with the background to even attempt to understand some of the 
technical finance issues that were at the root of the risks faced by the organisation. The above 
comments offer interesting parallels with the perceived issues of governance, and the recent 
banking crisis, concerning the lack of understanding by participants, at all levels, of the financial risks 
at play (Conyon et al., 2011; Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011). 
Key themes and conclusions 
The key themes emerging from this study can be summarised as follows: 
. A high degree of commitment was stated, by all parties, to having effective financial 
governance. 
. It was accepted that financial strategy is an essential part of financial governance but it is 
not clear that such a commitment is translated into having robust financial strategies in 
practice. 
. The necessity of financial reporting to the Board was acknowledged but there are concerns 
about the complexity of the reports produced and the extent to which they were 
understood by the various parties involved. 
. There are potential inadequacies of budgeting systems and costing systems which are 
serious concerns in a time of financial austerity. 
. There was an acknowledgement of the need for effective risk assessment and risk 
management systems. 
. There was seen to be a lack of understanding of the financial issues by the NEDs and their 
contribution is not being maximised. 
. The complexity of the funding process was causing opaqueness, for all concerned, of the 
financial risks for the organisation. This may have parallels with the complexity of the 
banking sector and the failures of governance in that sector. 
The above analysis provides strong evidence of issues that cause concern regarding financial 
governance within the NHS. There is evidence of complacency among all parties that the system is 
relatively robust in many areas. However, the complexity of the systems is the cause of opaqueness 
in the window of governance, which the authors see as a contribution to the debate in financial 
governance in the NHS and which mirrors the general perceived failings of governance in other 
sectors, which have resulted in catastrophic consequences for the World economy. 
As already noted, the NHS is undergoing change on a scale never before experienced in its history in 
terms of management reorganisation, financial philosophy and, in particular, the scale of financial 
austerity. This would seem to be a time when the need for strong financial governance has never 
been greater. However, it is important to emphasise that this research took place partly before the 
onset of financial austerity and partly after its onset. It appears that many of the weaknesses in 
financial governance were in existence prior to the onset of austerity and it would seem likely the 
onset of financial austerity will only magnify these weaknesses. Indeed, some of the interviews 
undertaken with DOFs and NEDs identified recognition of this and a need for urgent action. We see 
an urgent need for research into how NHSTs are dealing with the pressures of austerity and how 
well the existing frameworks of financial governance are coping. 
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